LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES:

THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT FINDS
COHABITATION PROVISIONS ENFORCEABLE
In the area of divorce law, the judiciary in New Jersey has often
walked a tightrope, attempting to balance the competing forces of
freedom of contract and the need for equity and fairness in the
resolution of domestic disputes.'
This balancing act has been
This judicial balancing arguably began with Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557,
158 A.2d 508 (1960). In Schlemm, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the

Superior Court's power to order the specific performance of spousal support
agreements. See id. at 581-82, 158 A.2d at 522. The court averred that such
agreements between spouses are "at least as binding as a privately executed written

contract between them." Id. at 582, 158 A.2d at 522. The Schlemm court emphasized,
however, that courts should direct the specific performance of support agreements
only "to the extent that they are just and equitable." Id. Provided with few
guidelines regarding how the contract/equity weighing process should be performed
following Schlemm, courts struggled to apply the rule. See, e.g., Schiff v. Schiff, 116
N.J. Super. 546, 283 A.2d 131 (App. Div. 1971). In Schiff, the appellate division,

taking a cue from the Schlemm court's likening of support agreements to other
privately held contracts, drew a sharp distinction between consensual separation
agreements and those determined by judicial decree. See id. at 560-61, 283 A.2d at
138-39. The Schiff court asserted that greater deference should be given to the
former and that "[a] far greater showing of changed circumstances must be made"
before the court will modify such consensual agreements. Id. at 561, 283 A.2d at 139.
The Schiff rule was summarily rejected in Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360, 371
A.2d 1, 6 (1977). In Smith, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that, in
determining the need for modification, courts should treat equally support
arrangements arrived at consensually and those imposed by court order. See id. The
Smith court held that "[i]n each case the court must determine what, in the light of
all the facts presented to it, is equitable and fair, giving due weight to the strong
public policy favoring stability of arrangements." Id. The Smith court explained that
"trial judges should have the utmost leeway and flexibility in determining what isjust
and equitable in making allocations of marital assets .... ." Id. Three years later, the
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the rule set down in Smith. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83
NJ. 139, 148, 416 A.2d 45, 49 (1980). The Lepis court opined that
[i]nitially it might appear that this rule would diminish the advantages
of separation and property settlement agreements, since they would
provide no greater certainty or stability than a judicial determination.
However, granting a greater degree of permanence to negotiated
agreements would tend to make them a riskier arrangement for
spouses who are likely to be harmed by changed circumstances.
Typically, they have been spouses who are economically dependent;
they generally have been wives with custody of children. Often
consensual agreements would not be in their best interests if only
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performed against a backdrop of the liberalization of divorce laws,
rising rates of divorce, s and dramatic changes in gender and domestic
"unconscionable" circumstances would warrant modification. As we
recognized in rejecting Schiff contract principles have little place in the
law of domestic relations.
Id., 416 A.2d at 49-50.
In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to retreat to a more contractfriendly position. See Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984). In Faherty,
the court held that arbitration provisions in settlement agreements are valid and
enforceable. See id. at 108, 477 A.2d 1262. The court reasoned that, because
arbitration is statutorily recognized as a valid means of resolving contract disputes,
no policy rationale prevented divorcing couples from arbitrating their disputes. See
id. at 107, 477 A.2d at 1261-62. While the Faherty court discussed equitable
considerations in relation to arbitrating child custody and support issues, such
considerations were far less prominent in the court's evaluation of the arbitration of
alimony disputes. See id. at 107-11, 477 A.2d at 1261-63. With respect to arbitration
provisions contained in spousal support agreements, the court in Faherty declared
that "[i]t is fair and reasonable that parties who have agreed to be bound by
arbitration in a formal, written separation agreement should be so bound." Id. at
107, 477 A.2d at 1262.
In contrast, the appellate division held that an
anticohabitation provision in a settlement agreement could be unenforceable. See
Melletz v. Melletz, 271 N.J. Super. 359, 368, 638 A.2d 898, 903 (App. Div. 1994). In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that courts should enforce
settlement agreements only to the extent that those agreements are fair, equitable,
and just. See id.; see also ROSEMARIE BELLO-TRULAND ET AL., DOMESTIC LAW IN NEW
JERSEY 51-61 (1992) (summarizing New Jersey law regarding alimony, maintenance,
and child support); Sally Burnett Sharp, FairnessStandards and Separation Agreements:
A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1984)
("Nowhere are the tensions between [the principles of marriage and the principles
of the economic marketplace] more obvious than in the continuing attempts of the
law to accommodate freedom to contract ... with restrictions on the ability of
spouses to contract with regard to dissolution of marriage.").
2 See generallyJ. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE
FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND
(tracing the
changing culture of divorce in America during the twentieth century by exploring
the events and shifts in attitudes leading up to dramatic reforms in divorce law, the
LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997)

no-fault divorce revolution, and its aftermath); see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of
Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 773, 783-84 (1996). Ellman argues that
remnants of the fault-based divorce system remained even after divorce law reform in
many states. See id. With respect to the continued presence of fault in alimony and
support arrangements, Ellman states that
[a] limony, in contrast, has undergone no widespread reforms in basic
theory analogous to the joint ownership or marital property movement
in common law states. Its change of name from alimony, to
maintenance or spousal support, was intended by many reformers to
signal the law's movement away from divorce laws based on fault and
gender roles, but the idea of "need" upon which the reformed support
claim was to be based did not always carry enough weight to complete
this transition. Unlike marital property, the alimony claim remained
largely discretionary in both entitlement and amount. In a system with
few bright lines, or even dim ones, it is not surprising that spousal
conduct would often be included, along with everything else, among
the open-ended list of factors that a court may consider. In that sense,
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fault's continued presence in the alimony law of these states reflects,
more than anything else, the primitive state of alimony law generally.
Id.
Moreover, "Oljudgments about individual responsibility within marriage survive in a
variety of divorce law contexts, from grounds, to alimony, to property distribution, to
the related context of child custody." See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and
Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Area, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2532 (1994).
Woodhouse observes that, while almost all states allow spouses to divorce without any
showing of fault on the part of either party, many jurisdictions consider fault when
determining appropriate property division or support obligations.
See id.
Woodhouse also highlights the existence of fault divorce as an option in many states,
where fault and no-fault grounds have been combined to create "hedged no-fault"
systems. See id.
For a critique of the divorce revolution, see Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the
Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and
Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993). Starnes laments that the
shift to a no-fault divorce scheme "is not good news for approximately sixteen million
married women who are not employed outside their homes because they are
'keeping house.'" Id. at 70. The women most at risk, according to Starnes, are
homemakers or "the heroines of the Betty Crocker Culture." Id. Starnes argues that
mothers of young children and other women who have assumed the role of primary
caretaker also face substantial risk in light of the fact that the women's
responsibilities at home have limited their career choices and possibilities for
advancement. See id. Starnes states that "[i]f their marriages end, these women may
learn the true meaning of 'the divorce revolution' as they are judged by divorce
courts determined to implement the fashionable rhetoric that men and women are
equal." Id.; see also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987). Kay argues that treating men
and women differently may be appropriate in the context of "traditional" marriages
in which wives are almost wholly dependent on their husbands. See id. at 4. The
author explains that "[w]omen's dependency upon their husbands for part or all of
their support during marriage, together with their willingness to assume their
traditional role as caretakers of children, are the social and cultural constraints that
give rise to their vulnerability at divorce." Id. at 79.
3 While the divorce rate in the United States has been stable since 1988, it
rose
steadily from 2.5 divorces per 1000 persons in 1966 to a high of 5.3 in 1979 and 1981.
See 43 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL DIVORCE

STATISTICS, 1989 and 1990, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 9, Supplement (1995).

In 1993, the latest date for which data are available, the rate was 4.6. See id. For a
comparison of divorce trends among nations, see generally WILLIAM J. GOODE,
WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS (1993).

For an economic perspective on the

interplay between legal rights and divorce rates, see Simon Clark, Law, Property, and
Marital Dissolution, 109 ECON. J. C41 (1999). Clark asserts that "[h]ow assets and
resources are allocated within a marriage, and on dissolution, plays a central role in
the analysis [of divorce law]. These two branches of the law define resource rights
that determine the gains and losses from divorce, and these rights are also important
in determining whether divorce occurs." Id. at C42. Clark concludes that divorce
law reform and property law reform must be considered concurrently in order for
legislators to avoid unintended, negative policy consequences. See id. at C53. For an
interesting discussion of the evolution of divorce in a distinctively broader context,
see RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER:

A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY

(1988).
Commenting on the connection between reforms in divorce law and
increased levels of divorce, Phillips notes that
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The resulting, sometimes
roles during the past forty years.4
disharmonious, patchwork quilt of decisions is hardly surprising.5
In New Jersey, there has long been a strong public policy
favoring voluntary agreements to resolve marital conflicts.6 Likewise,
divorce law reforms had little or nothing to do with setting off the most
recent divorce rate increases. In almost all countries divorce rates had
begun to rise before legal reforms were enacted or came into force,
and the widespread introduction of no-fault divorce legislation during
the 1970s was partly a response to increasing divorce, not a cause of it.
Id. at 620. In contrast, Phillips cites the entrance of women into the workforce as a
key factor in the upswing in divorce rates. See id. In connecting women's increased
presence in the labor market and rising divorce rates, Phillips remarks that,
"[a]lthough the directions of influence or causality between the two trends must
remain speculative at the social level, the suggested links are convincing enough."
Id. at 622.
4 See generally DIFONZO, supra note 2 (chronicling the evolution of divorce
law in
the twentieth century).
5 See Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 153-55, 456 A.2d 102, 104-05 (1983) (holding
that cohabitation by a dependent spouse constitutes changed circumstances as an
initial showing for a modification of alimony, but that the test for modification is the
economic need of the dependent spouse); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501,
453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982) (recognizing the concept of reimbursement alimony when
one spouse during the marriage financially contributed to the other's attainment of
a professional degree); Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 133, 447 A.2d 173, 177 (1982)
(holding that support agreements between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable);
Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 643-44, 428 A.2d 1301, 1303-04 (1981) (declaring
that escalation clauses contained in support agreements were not invalid per se, but
were subject to an inquiry into whether enforcement would be fair and equitable);
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 149, 416 A.2d 45, 50 (1980) ("The equitable authority of a
court to modify support obligations in response to changed circumstances,
regardless of their source, cannot be restricted."); Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358,
371 A.2d 1, 5 (1977) (finding that when equitable distribution is sought pursuant to
a new statute concerning alimony, an earlier settlement agreement will be a bar to
the extent that it is a "property agreement" and is shown to be fair and equitable);
Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569, 264 A.2d 49, 52 (1970) (holding that courts
have discretion to modify settlement agreements "upon a showing of changed
circumstances"); Schlemm, 31 N.J. at 581-82, 158 A.2d at 522 (1960) (ruling that
settlement agreements are specifically enforceable to the extent that they are fair and
equitable); Melletz, 271 N.J. Super. at 368, 638 A.2d at 903 (finding anticohabitation
provisions of settlement agreements unenforceable to the extent that they stray from
economic standards); Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 64, 347 A.2d 799,
803 (App. Div. 1975) (holding that, if it can be shown that a former spouse is being
financially supported in whole or in part by a cohabitant, the supporting spouse may
ask the court to reduce or extinguish support obligations).
6 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358, 371 A.2d 1, 5 (1977). In
Smith, the
court declared that "fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual consent
should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed." Id.; see also Faherty v. Faherty, 97
N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984). In Faherty, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded
that arbitration clauses in separation agreements are enforceable. See id. at 107, 477
A.2d at 1262. The court noted that the "[e]nforcement of arbitration clauses
pertaining to alimony... is a logical extension of the view.., that parties should be
granted as much autonomy as possible in the ordering of their personal lives." Id.
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a policy supporting the "stability of arrangements" in the marital area
has also developed in the state. Furthermore, NewJersey courts have
held that divorce settlement agreements are specifically enforceable
in equity.8
Tempering the "hands-off' approach to divorce settlement, title
2A, section 34-23 of the NewJersey Statutes requires that a dependent
spouse receive alimony to maintain his or her standard of living and
also reserves for the judiciary the right to modify such alimony
awards." Moreover, the New Jersey Legislature deemed a new
7 See Smith, 72 N.J. at 360, 371 A.2d at 6. The Smith court stated that "[iln
each

case the court must determine what, in the light of all the facts presented to it, is
equitable and fair, giving due weight to the strong public policy favoring stability of
arrangements." Id.; see also Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 428 A.2d 1301 (1981).
The Petersen court observed that
[i]t would be shortsighted and unwise for courts to reject out of hand
consensual solutions to vexatious personal matrimonial problems that
Voluntary
have been advanced by the parties themselves.
accommodations regarding matrimonial differences are highly
desirable and make a major contribution to the fulfillment of "the
strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements."
Id at 645, 428 A.2d at 1304 (citations omitted).
8 See Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 581-82, 158 A.2d 508, 522 (1960)
(recognizing the court's "power to direct the specific performance of the terms of
husband-wife support agreements to the extent that they are just and equitable").
The term "equity" is defined as:
Fairness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing .... The body of principles
constituting what is fair and right; natural law .... The recourse to

principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to
particular circumstances .... The system of law or body of principles

originating in the English Court of Chancery and superseding the
common and statute law ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1987). The statute states in part that
[plending any matrimonial action brought in this State or elsewhere,
or after judgment of divorce or maintenance, whether obtained in this
State or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or
maintenance of the parties

. . .

as the circumstances of the parties and

the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just ....
Id. The statute also lists the factors to be considered when determining the
appropriate amount of alimony to be awarded, including:
(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay; (2) The duration
of the marriage; (3) The age, physical and emotional health of the
parties; (4) The standard of living established in the marriage and the
likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable
standard of living; (5) The earning capacities, educational levels,
vocational skills, and employability of the parties; (6) The length of
absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance; (7)
The parental responsibilities for the children; (8) The time and
expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the
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marriage by the 'dependent party so significant a change in life
circumstances as to require automatic termination of alimony.'0
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with
the issue of whether cohabitation," like marriage, should trigger the
availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for
future acquisitions of capital assets and income; (9) The history of the
financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage by each party
including contributions to the care and education of the children and
interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities; (10)
The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on
equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to
the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair; and (11) Any
other factors which the court may deem relevant.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1999).
Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the code contains the following passage with regard to modification of
an alimony award:
An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified based either upon
changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances
that the court found would occur at the time of the rehabilitative
award. This section is not intended to preclude a court from modifying
permanent alimony awards based upon the law.
Id.
New Jersey courts have recognized both rehabilitative alimony and
reimbursement alimony. See BELLO-TRULAND, supra note 1, at 54. The authors
explain that "[t]he purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to permit the enhancement
and improvement of the earning capacity of the supported spouse."
Id.
Reimbursement alimony, on the other hand, may be appropriate "where one spouse
has financially supported the other's efforts to obtain a professional degree or
license." Id.; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). In
Mahoney, the court introduced the concept of reimbursement alimony by explaining
'that regardless of the appropriateness of permanent alimony or the presence or
absence of marital property to be equitably distributed, there will be circumstances
where a supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial contributions he
or she made to the spouse's successful professional training." Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at
534. The court noted that reimbursement alimony consisted of "all financial
contributions towards the former spouse's education, including household expenses,
educational costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by the
supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license." I.
o See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-25 (West Supp. 1999). The statute provides
in
relevant part:
If after the judgment of divorce a former spouse shall remarry,
permanent alimony shall terminate as of the date of remarriage except
that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of remarriage
shall not be vacated or annulled. A former spouse who remarries shall
promptly so inform the spouse paying permanent alimony as well as
the collecting agency, if any.
Id,IaI
I While the term is defined in a variety of ways, "cohabitation [is] [t] he fact or
state of living together, esp[ecially] as partners in life, usu[ually] with the suggestion
of sexual relations." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 254 (7th ed. 1999); see also DAVID B.
LARSON ET AL., THE COSTLY CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: ASSESSING THE CLINICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT OF MARITAL DISRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES

31 (1995) (defining cohabitation as "the sharing of living quarters with a sexual
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termination of alimony payments when a settlement agreement
between divorcing spouses provides for such a termination.'2 In
Konzelman v. Konzelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
are
cohabitation provisions of divorce settlement agreements
and fair. 3
voluntary,
mutual,
be
to
found
if
enforceable
Upon their divorce, Kathleen and Lawrence Konzelman, each
with the benefit of counsel, entered into a property settlement
agreement that contained a cohabitation provision. 4 The agreement
provided that if Mrs. Konzelman cohabited with an unrelated male
for a span of four continuous months, Mr. Konzelman's support
obligation would end.' 5 Approximately a year and a half after the
divorce, Mr. Konzelman retained the services of Noel J. Kirkwood, a

partner without a formal marriage agreement"). Larson and his co-authors note a
marked increase in cohabitation, pointing out that "the proportion of first marriages
that were preceded by cohabitation increased from 8 percent... in the late 1960's to
25 percent... by the late 1980's .... In 1992 the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that
there were slightly more than 6 million unmarried, opposite-sex partners that were
living together." Id. at 16 (citations omitted). Citing a 1991 study, the authors also
state that "nearly half of women 25 to 34 years of age had cohabitated. The majority
of women who had cohabitated had done so before marriage. Almost all of the
younger women had cohabited before marriage, whereas more of the older women
had cohabitated later (i.e., after a divorce or separation)." Id. at 18. In addition, the
authors assert that, in terms of attitudes, cohabitation has enjoyed a consistently high
acceptance rate throughout the eighties and nineties. See id. at 31. According to
these authors, negative feelings toward cohabitation appear to be declining. See id.
The authors found that "in 1992, only 4 percent of women agreed.., that 'a man
and a woman living together without being married are living in a way that could be
destructive to society.' In contrast, more than twice this amount of women (9
percent) agreed with this statement in 1980." Id. (citations omitted).
Not surprisingly, courts in other jurisdictions have been confronted with similar
issues of cohabitation and alimony. See, e.g., Sara Z. Moghadam, Survey, Dismissing the
Purpose and Public Policy Surrounding Spousal Support, 56 MD. L. REV. 927 (1997).
Moghadam criticizes the Maryland Court of Appeals for failing "to acknowledge the
purpose of spousal support and the numerous ways in which a spouse can use it to
exert unjust and inappropriate control over the recipient's personal life." Id. at 927.
The author argues that "[t] he court's failure to apply these policy considerations to
its interpretation of the term 'cohabitation' will likely result in the disparate
adjudication of future cases concerning the termination of spousal support." Id.; see
also Sally Burnett Sharp, Step by Step: The Development of the Distributive Consequences of
Divorce in North Carolina,76 N.C. L. REv. 2017 (1998). Sharp describes a state statute
in North Carolina that provides that spousal support will terminate if the dependent
spouse is cohabiting. See id. at 2099. Commenting on the law, Sharp averred that
"[t]o suggest that the legislature has opened a Pandora's box of remarkable and
unfortunate proportions is to state the matter mildly." Id.
12 See Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 191, 729 A.2d 7, 10 (1999).
13 See id. at 198, 729 A.2d at 14.
14 See id. at 191, 729 A.2d at 10.
15 See id. The agreement required Mr. Konzelman to pay
Mrs. Konzelman $700 a
month in support and maintenance. See id.
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private investigator, to determine if Mrs. Konzelman was cohabiting
with anyone. 6 The investigator observed Mrs. Konzelman's home for
127 days and reported that an "unrelated adult male," Roger Liput,
appeared to be residing with Mrs. Konzelman.' 7 Pursuant to the
investigator's findings, Mr. Konzelman stopped making alimony
payments. 1

Mrs. Konzelman filed a Notice of Motion and certification that
denied cohabitation and demanded that Mr. Konzelman resume
paying alimony.19 Mr. Konzelman responded by filing a cross-motion
in which he sought to extinguish his support obligations.20 Although
Mr. Konzelman successfully established his ex-wife's cohabitation with
Mr. Liput, the trial court held that the cohabitation provision in the
settlement agreement, which called for termination of alimony, was
invalid.2 ' The trial court then conducted a plenary hearing to
estimate the amount of financial support Liput was either providing
to, or gaining from, Mrs. Konzelman.22 As a result of this hearing, Mr.
Konzelman's alimony payments were reduced by $170 per week.23
6

See id. In addition to Mr. Kirkwood, Mr. Konzelman hired L.S. Stephens, Inc.,

a private agency specializing in investigation. See id. L.S. Stephens, Inc. performed
surveillance of Mrs. Konzelman's residence during the last week that Kirkwood
monitored the home. See id.
17 See id. Kirkwood observed Liput coming and going from
the residence on a
regular basis. See id. Liput was also observed performing chores on the property,
answering the door at the house, using the garage door to gain access to the garage,
and parking his car in the garage. See id. at 191-92, 729 A.2d at 10. Kirkwood also
reported that Liput "picked up the newspaper on a regular basis" and "used Mrs.
Konzelman's number as a contact number for members of his softball team." Id. at
192, 729 A.2d at 10. Mrs. Konzelman and Liput admitted that they had "a close,
exclusive, 'romantic relationship'" and that they had spent at least thirty weekends a
year and weekday nights together. See Konzelman v. Konzelman, 307 N.J. Super. 150,
154, 704 A.2d 591,592-93 (1998).
18 SeeKonzelman, 158 N.J. at 192, 729 A.2d at 10.
19 See id. Mrs. Konzelman also demanded payment of arrearages. See
id.
20 See id. In support of his cross-motion, Mr. Konzelman supplied
the court with
certifications from four private investigators attesting to Mrs. Konzelman's
cohabitation with Liput. See id. Mrs. Konzelman responded with certifications
rebutting the statements of the private detectives. See id.
21 See id., 729 A.2d at 11. During the plenary hearing regarding the issue of
cohabitation, which included 26 witnesses and lasted 13 days, Mr. Konzelman
presented evidence that Mrs. Konzelman and Liput vacationed together, with Liput
paying for most of the vacation expenses, that the couple spent holidays together,
and that they shared ajoint savings account. See id., 729 A.2d at 10. In addition, Mr.
Konzelman established that, although Liput did not possess a key to Mrs.
Konzelman's home, he did perform numerous household chores and knew the code
to disengage the household alarm system. See id., 729 A.2d at 11.
See id. at 192-93, 729 A.2d at 11.
23 See id. at 193, 729 A.2d at 11. The trial court found that Mrs. Konzelman was
receiving approximately $170 weekly from unidentified sources. See id. The court
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Mr. Konzelman appealed, contesting the trial court's judgment
regarding the validity of the cohabitation provision contained in the
couple's settlement agreement. 4 Mrs. Konzelman cross-appealed,
challenging the trial court's finding of cohabitation as well as the
reduction in alimony.2' Reversing the trial court's judgment, the
appellate division found the cohabitation provision enforceable."
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Mrs. Konzelman's
petition for certification. 7
The court found that the policy
considerations that permit the discontinuation of alimony payments
upon remarriage also allow for the termination of alimony upon
cohabitation when both parties have agreed to such an
arrangement. 8 Thus, the court held that a cohabitation provision in
a divorce settlement agreement is not repugnant to public policy and
stands as a valid basis for ending alimony obligations regardless of the
economic impact of the new, "cohabitative" relationshp.24
For the past forty years, New Jersey courts have wrestled with the
competing interests of equity and freedom of contract in the area of
divorce law. 0 In 1960, the NewJersey Supreme Court held in Schlemm
v. Schlemm3' that spousal agreements are specifically enforceable in
equity to the extent that they are fair and just.s2 In Schlemm, a New

Jersey couple who had been married for twenty years filed for
divorce."3 During the proceedings, they decided to enter into a
mutual and voluntary agreement regarding division of property and

attributed this support to Liput. See id. Reviewing the trial court's decision, the
appellate division noted that "[t]here was substantial evidence in the record to
support the court's finding that Mr. Liput was contributing at least $170 a week
toward Ms. Konzelman's financial support." Konzelman, 307 N.J. Super. at 155, 704
A.2d at 593.
24 See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 193,
729 A.2d at 11.
25 Seeid., 729 A.2d at 11-12.
See Konzelman, 307 N.J. Super. at 161, 704 A.2d at 597. The court held "that a
provision of a property settlement agreement, freely entered into, which causes
permanent alimony to terminate if the dependent spouse enters into a new
relationship which has all the indicia of marriage except a license is enforceable." Id.
27 See Konzelman v. Konzelman, 153 N.J. 405, 709 A.2d 798 (1998).
28 SeeKonzelman, 158 N.J. at 196, 729 A.2d at 13.
29
See id., 158 N.J. at 197, 729 A.2d at 13.
' See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey judiciary's
approach to equity and contract law in the divorce context).
31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d 508 (1960).
32 See id. at 581-82, 158 A.2d at 522. In so holding,
the court declared that "apart
from its statutory authority, the Superior Court has power to direct the specific
performance of the terms of husband-wife support agreements to the extent that
they are just and equitable." Id. (citations omitted).
" See id. at 560, 158 A.2d at 510.
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maintenance payments to be made by Mr. Schlemm to Mrs.
Schlemm. 34 The chancery division, recognizing the parties' amicable
agreement, issued an order dismissing the complaint and counterclaim without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Schlemm traveled
to Nevada, where he instituted divorce
proceedings,
and a Nevada
•
6
court entered a formal decree of divorce. Approximately four years
after the divorce proceedings in both New Jersey and Nevada were
finalized, Mrs. Schlemm brought an action claiming that Mr.
Schlemm had failed to fulfill his support and maintenance
obligations under the settlement agreement, 37 while Mr. Schlemm
argued that he was under no obligation to support Mrs. Schlemm.

See id. at 560-61, 158 A.2d at 510. The agreement stated in part that
Mr.
Schlemm
agreed to provide for the wife to maintain the properties and upkeep
and further carrying charges just in the manner that he has been doing
up to the present date so that she will be provided for in the same
manner and to the same degree as she has been provided for by him
up to this time.
Id. at 561, 158 A.2d at 510. The settlement also provided for the dismissal of Mrs.
Schlemm's complaint for divorce and Mr. Schlemm's counter-claim for divorce. See
id. at 560, 158 A.2d at 510.
M See id. at 561, 158 A.2d at 510. Shortly thereafter, the Schlemms apportioned
the communal property and assets pursuant to the agreement. See id. at 561, 158
A.2d at 510-11.
See id. at 563, 158 A.2d at 511. Mrs. Schlemm agreed to convey power
of
attorney to a Reno lawyer in order for him to act on her behalf at the divorce
proceedings. See id. at 561-62, 158 A.2d at 511. Mrs. Schlemm agreed to go along
with the Nevada divorce proceedings so long as Mr. Schlemm settled with her
regarding a $20,000 insurance policy. See id. at 562, 158 A.2d at 511. Mrs. Schlemm's
stepson then delivered to her $50,000 in cash, which had been left in the stepson's
care by Mr. Schlemm. See id. After the divorce decree was entered, Mr. Schlemm
returned to NewJersey. See id.
.7 See Schlemm, 31 N.J. at 563, 158 A.2d at 512.
With respect to the issue of the
specific enforceability of the couple's agreement, the chancery court sided with Mrs.
Schlemm and found the contract to be specifically enforceable. See id. at 564-65, 158
A.2d at 512-13. Mrs. Schlemm also requested that the court declare "the Nevada
divorce to be of no force." Id. at 563-64, 158 A.2d at 512. The chancery court found
the Nevada divorce valid and in effect, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
See id. at 564, 571, 158 A.2d at 512, 516. The dissent in Schlemm, however, sharply
criticized the court's recognition of the divorce, pointing to the $50,000 payment to
Mrs. Schlemm as the purchase price for the divorce. See id. at 586, 158 A.2d at 524
(Francis, J., dissenting in part). The dissent lamented that "[t]o sanction the
destruction of marriage when it is accomplished by sickening sham is to ignore a
malignancy eating at the vitals of our country." Id. at 585, 158 A.2d at 524 (Francis,
J., dissenting in part).
&9 See id. at 564, 158 A.2d at 512. In addition, Mr.
Schlemm maintained that the
Nevada divorce should be given "full faith and credit" by the New Jersey courts. See
34
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In Schlemm, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the court
has an inherent power to specifically enforce settlement agreements
between former spouses to the extent that they are just and
equitable."9 The court held that the Schlemms' agreement was
In so holding, the court reasoned that,
specifically enforceable. '
because the parties and their counsel properly presented the
agreement in open court, with adequate consideration, the
settlement was at least as binding as any privately executed contract
between the parties.4 ' Thus, the court validated the lower court's
42
conclusion that the agreement was fair and in full force and effect.

Expanding on the rule established in Schlemm, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Berkowitz v. Berkowit 4 3 announced that the judiciary

has the power to modify divorce agreements based on a showing of
"changed circumstances. '" 4 In Berkowitz, an ex-husband petitioned
the court to modify his divorce settlement agreement in order to
reduce his child support payments to his ex-wife, who had since
remarried.45 The Berkowitz court recognized the right of the court to
modify settlement agreements in order to comport
with 46fairness and
•
equity when there has been a change in circumstances. While the
court declined to modify the Berkowitz's agreement based on the fact
that such changed circumstances had been contemplated and
accounted for at the time of drafting, the court took the opportunity
to assert its discretion to do so in an appropriate situation.47
39 See id. at
40

581-82, 158 A.2d at 522.
See id. at 582, 158 A.2d at 522.

41 See id.The court stated that "[t] he deliberate stipulation in court was a proper
one, was based on adequate consideration, was participated in by both parties and
their counsel, and was at least as binding as a privately executed written contract
between them." Id.
42 See id. The court noted that "[t]he trial court . . . found that
there was a
binding agreement... which was 'fair and just' and in 'full force and effect' and we
see no reason for disturbing its finding." Id.
4A 55 N.J. 564, 264 A.2d 49 (1970).
44 See id. at 569, 264 A.2d
at 52.
45 See id. at 568, 264 A.2d at 51. After the couple's two sons left home
for college,
Mr. Berkowitz filed a motion to modify the support provision of the couple's
settlement agreement from $100 per week to a $40 payment while the couple's
daughter still resided with Mrs. Berkowitz. See id.
See id. at 569, 264 A.2d at 52.
47 See id. at 569-70, 264 A.2d at 52. Referring to the agreement between
Mr. and
Mrs. Berkowitz, the court commented that "the parties contemplated.., remarriage
by the wife and provided that in such event plaintiff would convey his interest in the
residence to defendant in return for cancellation of his obligations regarding the
property. They made no provision, however, for reducing the children's support
payments because of such remarriage." Id. Accordingly, the court explained that all
of the "changed circumstances" were contemplated by the parties and provided for
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A few years later, in Smith v. Smith,48 the New Jersey Supreme
Court acknowledged the judiciary's flexibility to modify settlement
agreements by virtue of state statute and also recognized the state's
policy49 that favored the stability of arrangements in the matrimonial
area.
In Smith, a couple entered into a separation agreement in
1965.w Approximately six years later, after significant amendments
were made to state divorce law, Mr. Smith filed for divorce, seeking
the court's recognition of the earlier agreement.5'
The Smith court drew a distinction between agreements that are5
property settlements and those that involve support arrangements.
The New Jersey Supreme Court declared that those contracts falling
into the former category are a bar to judicially constructed statutory
equitable distribution to the extent that they are fair and equitable. 2
in their agreement. See id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 52. Finally, the court noted that,
"[a]bsent evidence of either plaintiff's inability to meet his financial obligations
under the Agreement or other unforeseen changes in circumstances, reduction of
the support payments in the instant case was unjustified." Id.
72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977).
49 See id. at 360, 371 A.2d at 6. The court
announced that
the extent of the change in circumstances, whether urged by plaintiff
or defendant, shall be the same, regardless of whether the support
payments being questioned were determined consensually or by
judicial decree. In each case, the court must determine what, in the
light of all the facts presented to it, is equitable and fair, giving due
weight to the strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements.
Id.
See id. at 354, 371 A.2d at 3. The agreement was described by Mrs. Smith as a
.separation agreement"; Mr. Smith characterized it as a "property settlement
agreement." See id. The instrument declared that "'[t]he Parties have agreed to live
separate and apart and desire by this Agreement to settle their property rights and
obligations.'" Id. The agreement also required Mr. Smith to provide certain benefits
and support for Mrs. Smith and the couple's child. See id.
51 See id. at 353, 371 A.2d at 2. In her counterclaim, Mrs. Smith sought that the
agreement be declared invalid and that an equitable distribution of the assets and
determination of Mr. Smith's support obligation pursuant to the recently enacted
amendments to state divorce statutes be performed. See id.
5
See id. at 357, 371 A.2d at 4. According to the court, separation
agreements,
when analyzed with respect to property rights, "appear to be essentially of two types,
and may conveniently be referred to as support agreements and property settlement
agreements." Id. In discussing agreements entered prior to the reform of the state's
divorce laws, the court described support agreements as those that provide for
.support payments to the wife for herself and for any minor children in her custody.
They often contained provisions dividing tangible personalty, as well as any jointly
owned assets, including real estate held by husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety." Id., 371 A.2d at 5. Property settlement agreements, in contrast, were
characterized by the court as those that go further and "often provided for
substantial transfers of assets-generally from husband to wife-often, but not
always, taking the form of transfers in trust." Id. at 357-58, 371 A.2d at 5.
See id. at 358, 371 A.2d at 5. The court held "that where equitable distribution
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The court held that those agreements that are rightly characterized
as support contracts, however, stand as no obstacle to court-fashioned
equitable distribution. 5
In 1980, the fairness-versus-contract dilemma resurfaced in Lepis
v. Lepis.55 In Lepis, the court announced that settlement agreements

are not controlled strictly by the principles of contract law and that
such agreements may be modified upon a showing of "changed
circumstances." 6 Four years after the Lepises' divorce was finalized,
Mrs. Lepis moved for modification of the settlement agreement,
seeking increased support for her and her children. The NewJersey
Supreme Court's analysis in Lepis first focused on the effect of the
consensual agreement on the court's power to modify the contract by
highlighting title 2A, section 34-23 of the New Jersey Statutes, which
specifically recognizes the judiciary's ability to adjust support orders
at any time." Relying upon Schlemm, the court observed that specific
enforceability of settlement agreements is predicated upon the
flexibility of equity in ensuring that such agreements are just. 9 In
is sought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, an earlier separation agreement will be a bar
to such relief only if, and to the extent that, it can qualify as a property settlement,
and can likewise be shown to have been fair and equitable." Id. The court stressed
that "[o]nly then can it be said to be the substantial equivalent of an equitable
distribution of marital assets, sufficient tojustify denial of such relief." Id.
See Smith, 72 N.J. at 358, 371 A.2d at 5. The court concluded that the
arrangement between the Smiths was a support agreement and had "none of the
characteristics of a property settlement agreement." Id. Rejecting Mr. Smith's
assertion that the agreement was a property settlement, the court observed that such
an argument was "unimpressive since by this transaction the wife received only what
was hers already; in effect, the husband bought out his wife's interest in the
residence held by them as tenants by the entirety." Id. at 358-59, 371 A.2d at 5.
83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).
See id. at 146, 416 A.2d at 48. The court held that "alimony and support orders
define only the present obligations of the former spouses. Those duties are always
subject to review and modification on a showing of 'changed circumstances.'" Id.
'7
See id. at 144, 416 A.2d at 47-48. Upon their divorce, Mr. and Mrs. Lepis
entered into a detailed settlement agreement regarding alimony, child custody and
support, and property division. See id. t 143, 416 A.2d at 47. The agreement also
contained a provision barring future modification absent mutual consent. See id. at
144, 416 A.2d at 47. Without requiring Mr. Lepis to disclose his actual earnings, the
trial court denied Mrs. Lepis's motion. See id., 416 A.2d at 48. Reversing the lower
court's decision and remanding the case, the appellate division held that discovery
was necessary before making such a determination regarding modification of the
agreement. See id. The appellate court asserted that the lower court's refusal to
allow discovery of Mr. Lepis's income denied Mrs. Lepis the chance to demonstrate
"changed circumstances." See id. at 145, 416 A.2d at 48.
M See id. The court noted that "[t]he equitable power of the courts to modify
alimony and support orders at any time is specifically recognized by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23
Id.
See id. at 146, 416 A.2d at 49 (citing Schlemm, 31 N.J. at 581-82, 158 A.2d at 522).

1268

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1255

ruling that the nonmodification provision of the Lepises' agreement
was not a bar to judicial modification, the court stated that "the
equitable authority of a court to modify support obligations in
response to changed circumstances, regardless of their source,
cannot be restricted. "6°
Confronted with the issue of cohabitation, as in the case in
which a dependent spouse is living with a member of the opposite
sex, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gayet v. Gayet 6' again sought to
balance the competing interests of fairness and certainty in contract.
The court held that, while proof of cohabitation qualifies as an initial
showing of a "changed circumstance," such proof standing alone falls
short of what is required to carry a motion to extinguish alimony
obligations. 6 The court explained that cohabitation must be coupled
with a changed financial situation for modification to be allowed. 63 In
Gayet, the couple's divorce settlement required Mr. Gayet to pay

The court referred to Schlemm's rejection of the rule against specific enforceability
and recognized the court's ability to utilize "its 'highly flexible' remedial powers to
enforce the terms of interspousal support agreements 'to the extent that they are just
and equitable.'" Id. (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 149, 416 A.2d at 51. The court found that the appellate
division correctly
reversed the trial court's denial of Mrs. Lepis's motion. See id. at 159, 416 A.2d at 55.
The court determined that "[p]laintiff has alleged with specificity the increases in
her own and her children's needs caused by substantial inflation and the rising cost
of supporting growing children." Id. The court recognized that such changed
circumstances were likely to continue and, therefore, the lower court should inquire
whether Mrs. Lepis's ability to support herself and her children had been
substantially impaired. See id. Examining when modification would be appropriate,
the court listed a variety of situations that may satisfactorily signal "changed
circumstances." See id. at 151, 416 A.2d at 51. The court described such instances as
including:
an increase in the cost of living . . (an) increase or decrease in the
supporting spouse's income . . . (an) illness, disability or infirmity

arising after the original judgment ... the dependent spouse's loss of a
house or apartment... the dependent spouse's cohabitationwith another...
subsequent employment by the dependent spouse ... (or) changes in
federal income tax law ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
61 92 N.J. 149, 456 A.2d 102 (1983).
62 See id. at 153-55, 456 A.2d at 104-05.
In so holding, the court stated that
"[s]ince one of the procedural prerequisites to discovery and a hearing in a
modification proceeding under Lepis is an initial showing of changed circumstances,
we hold that cohabitation shall constitute such changed circumstances." Id. at 15455, 456 A.2d at 105.
63 See id. at 153-54, 456 A.2d at 104. The court declared that such
a "scheme
permits modification for changed circumstances resulting from cohabitation only if
one cohabitant supports or subsidizes the other under circumstances sufficient to
entitle the supporting spouse to relief." Id.
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alimony and child support for his two children. Two years after the
divorce judgment, Mr. Gayet moved to terminate alimony based on
his ex-wife's living with another man as husband and wife.65
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Gayet set forth two policies
that must be balanced to resolve the issue of cohabitation: the state
statutory provision requiring termination of alimony upon the
dependent spouse's remarriage and the state policy that ensures
personal privacy and autonomy.66 To resolve this conflict, the court
concluded that an economic needs test, as set forth in Garlinger v.
Garlinger,67 best balanced the interests at stake."8 The court observed
that the Garlingertest permits modification upon a showing that the
dependent spouse is financially supported by the third party, but also
See id. at 150, 456 A.2d at 102.
See id. The parties stipulated that Mrs. Gayet cohabited four nights a week for a
period of approximately four months. See id. After considering additional evidence,
the trial court determined that at the time of the hearing, Mrs. Gayet was "living
together" with another man. See id. Accordingly, the trial court reduced Mrs. Gayet's
alimony award retroactively for the period of cohabitation and terminated Mr.
Gayet's obligation after a stipulated date. See id. Subsequently, the appellate division
reversed the lower court's decision. See id.
66 See id. at 151, 456 A.2d at 103. The court noted
that the dictates of state
statutory law that require alimony to terminate upon remarriage "can conflict with
another state policy that guarantees individual privacy, autonomy, and the right to
develop personal relationships free from governmental sanctions." Id. (citations
omitted).
67 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (App. Div. 1975).
In Garlinger, the court
opined:
[W] here a former wife chooses to cohabit with a paramour, whether in
her abode or his, or otherwise consorts with him, the issue may well
arise whether, in the circumstances, she had further need for the
alimony. If it is shown that the wife is being supported in whole or in
part by the paramour, the former husband may come into court for a
determination of whether the alimony should be terminated or
reduced. Similarly, if the paramour resides in the wife's home without
contributing anything toward the purchase of food or the payment of
normal household bills, then there may be a reasonable inference that
the wife's alimony is being used, at least in part, for the benefit of the
paramour, in which case it could be argued with force that the amount
thereof should be modified accordingly. In short, the inquiry is
whether the former wife's illicit relationship with another man, apart
from the misconduct per se, has produced a change of circumstances
sufficient to entitle the former husband to relief.
Id. at 64, 347 A.2d at 803.
68 See Gayet, 92 N.J. at 153-54, 456 A.2d at 104.
In approving the Garlingertest, the
court announced that "[w]e believe that this test best balances the interests of
personal freedom and economic support. . . . 'The law must be concerned with the
economic realities of contemporary married life, not a model of domestic relations
that provided women with security in exchange for economic dependence and
discrimination.'" Id. at 154, 456 A.2d at 104 (quoting Lepis, 83 N.J. at 156, 416 A.2d
at 45).
65
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permits adjustment when the third party derives financial support
from the dependent spouse.'
In summary, the court stated
definitively that the economic realities of the situation should
determine the ultimate result in modification cases.70
7
In an important 1994 appellate division case, Melletz v. Melletz, '

the appellate court held that the withdrawal of alimony payments
2
may not be used to control the social activities of a former spouse.
In Melletz, the couple's divorce settlement contained a provision
allowing for the suspension of Mr. Melletz's alimony obligation when
his ex-wife cohabited "with a male unrelated to her by blood or
marriage."7 3 After placing his ex-wife's home under surveillance for
some time, Mr. Melletz moved to terminate his alimony obligation
based on his wife's cohabiting with an unrelated male.74
In affirming the lower court's decision in Melletz, the appellate
division announced that, although both parties admitted to
negotiating specifically for the cohabitation provision and to
bargaining freely for the agreement in general, the provision failed
because it attempted to regulate a dependent spouse's otherwise legal
behavior.75 Citing Gayet approvingly, the court declared that
See id. at 153, 456 A.2d at 104. The court asserted that modification
was
appropriate when "the third party contributed to the dependent spouse's support or
...
the third party resides in the dependent spouse's home without contributing
anything toward the household expenses." Id.
70 See id. at 154, 456 A.2d at 105. The court declared
that "economic realities
should dictate the result." Id.
71 271 N.J. Super. 359, 638 A.2d 898
(App. Div. 1994).
See id. at 367, 638 A.2d at 902. In support of this holding, the appellate court
declared that "apart from the economic impact upon either need or the ability to pay
recognized in Gayet v. Gayet ... or other matters of recognized mutual concern, the
payor spouse may not through loss or suspension of statutory alimony control the
social activities of the payee." Id. The appellate court conceded the parties were
permitted to agree "on generally-recognized standards of social behavior" if a
disputed issue involved conduct that was legal but might have a negative impact on
the children living in the household. Id The court emphasized, however, that such
issues "are non-economic and cannot be used for economic coercion." Id.
73 Id. at 361, 638 A.2d
at 899.
74 See id. at 361-62, 638 A.2d at 900. Mr. Melletz testified
that he was aware of
Mrs. Melletz's relationship with another man before the support agreement was
negotiated and that the cohabitation provision was included "'to stop what [was]
going on.'" Id. The trial court denied Mr. Melletz's motion to terminate his alimony
obliation, and Mr. Melletz appealed. See id. at 361, 638 A.2d at 899.
See id. at 368, 638 A.2d at 902. Reflecting upon the policy considerations
of
such a clause, the court professed that
[m]atters of personal preference, residence, or occupation, insofar as
they do not reflect changes in income or expenses or other matters of
recognized mutual concern, simply are not the business of a former
spouse. They do not relate to the payee's right to adequate support.
69
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economic coercion may not be exerted to control the noneconomic
activities of a dependent spouse. 76
In Konzelman v. Konzelman," the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared that cohabitation provisions of property settlement
agreements are enforceable if found to be mutual, voluntary, and
fair.78 Justice Handler, writing for a majority of five justices, averred
that because remarriage of a dependent spouse is grounds for
automatic suspension of alimony payments under New Jersey
statutory law, the termination of alimony obligations based on an exspouse's cohabitative, marriage-like relationship with a member of
the opposite sex comports with public policy. 9 Thus, the majority
concluded that courts should defer to freely bargained-for
agreements containing cohabitation provisions. 80
In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed the following
issues: whether a former spouse's new relationship, established as
one of cohabitation, qualifies as a "change in circumstances" and
whether a voluntary agreement containing a cohabitation provision
allowing for the termination of alimony is valid. 8'
In determining the answer to the first question, the majority
followed the precedent established in Gayet.82 The court yielded to
Gayet's economic needs test in ruling that cohabitation alone does
not constitute a change in circumstances." The court concluded that
Nor in the usual case are the courts inclined to apply precious
resources to the enforcement of or adjudicating the breach of such
agreements. So too with matters of cohabitation. It is enough that we
must monitor the economic impact of cohabitation allegations or
resolve other matters of the parties' continuing mutual concern.
Id at 366-67, 638 A.2d at 902.
76 See id. at 367, 638
A.2d at 902.
77 158 N.J. 185, 729 A.2d 7 (1999).
78 See id. at 198, 729 A.2d at 14 ("We conclude that based
on minimum standards
to assure their mutuality, voluntariness and fairness, cohabitation agreements may be
enforced.").
79 See id. at 196,
729 A.2d at 13.
The court indicated that the policy
considerations that authorize termination of alimony upon a dependent spouse's
remarriage also support the termination upon cohabitation. See id. Specifically, the
court recognized that "[t]he enforcement of a cohabitation agreement terminating
alimony comports generally with the legislative and public policy of our matrimonial
laws." Id
80 See id. at 197, 729 A.2d at 13.
The court acknowledged that deference was
appropriate "where the parties have agreed that cohabitation will constitute a
material changed circumstance, and that agreement has been judged fair and
equitable...." Id
a] See id. at 195-96, 729 A.2d at 12-13.
82 See id. at 196, 729 A.2d
at 12-13.
M See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 196, 729 A.2d at 12. The majority stated that
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alimony should be reduced only in proportion to the contribution
made by the third party to the dependent spouse's support."
Turning to the second, and more significant, issue at hand, the
court held that an inquiry into the dependent spouse's economic
situation is not necessary if there exists a new relationship that has all
of the characteristics of marriage and the settlement agreement
contains a cohabitation provision. 5 The majority opined that,
because under New Jersey statutory law86 a new marriage
automatically ends a former spouse's support obligation, when a new
marriage-like relationship is established under an instrument
containing a cohabitation provision, alimony payments may be
discontinued."' Thus, the court surmised that cohabitation provisions
do not contravene the state's public policy.8 Accordingly, the court
concluded that when such agreements are deemed fair and
equitable, the court should defer to such contracts.8 )

"[c] ohabitation constitutes a change of circumstances only if coupled with economic
consequences; the economic benefit enuring to either cohabitor must be sufficiently
material to justify relief." Id. (citations omitted).
84 See id., 729 A.2d at 12-13.
Applying the economic needs test, the court
determined that "the reduction in alimony is granted in proportion to the
contribution of the cohabitor to the dependent spouse's needs." Id.
M See id. at 196-97, 729 A.2d at 13. The court concluded that "where the
dependent spouse has entered into a new marriage-like relationship, the court need
not delve into the economic needs of the dependent former spouse." Id. at 197, 729
A.2d at 13.
86
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (detailing New Jersey's statutory law
regarding the termination of alimony obligations upon the remarriage of a
dependent spouse).
7 See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 196-97, 729 A.2d at 13. The court concurred
with the
appellate division's statement that
there are no considerations of public policy which should prevent
competent parties to a divorce from freely agreeing that if the
dependent spouse enters into a new relationship which, but for the
license, is tantamount to a marriage, the economic consequences of
the new relationship will be the same as those of remarriage.
Id. at 197, 729 A.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
M See id. at 196, 729 A.2d at 13. The court announced that "[tihe contractual
termination of alimony upon cohabitation is not violative of either statutory or public
policy." Id.
89 See id. at 197, 729 A.2d at 13. The court emphasized that such agreements
to
terminate alimony contingent upon cohabitation "must be voluntary and consensual,
based on assurances that [the] undertakings are fully informed, knowingly assumed,
and fair and equitable." Id. at 198, 729 A.2d at 14. The court acknowledged that the
fairness of modifying or eliminating alimony upon cohabitation must be considered
in view of all material circumstances and required a case-by-case analysis. See id The
court also reasoned that fairness in this context demanded that counsel represent
each party, that each party fully comprehend the agreement, and that a court review
and approve the agreement. See id. at 199, 729 A.2d at 14.
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While acknowledging the potential for uneven bargaining power
between the spouses," Justice Handler determined that the court's
holding was nevertheless necessary in order to encourage consensual
agreements to resolve matrimonial controversies.9
Similarly,92
conceding that concerns about privacy have merit in this context,
the majority maintained that judicial supervision over divorce
settlements will serve as a check on unfair provisions. 93 Furthermore,

See id. at 200, 729 A.2d at 15. The court noted that "[i]n considering the
enforceability of cohabitation agreements, concerns regarding inequality of
bargaining power are genuine and... may arise not only from economic
dependence but also the psychological and emotional factors in the relationship
between the former spouses." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court stressed
that courts must ensure the fairness and voluntariness of such agreements prior to
enforcement. See id.
91 See id. The court remarked that "[w]hile we are aware
of the potential for
unfairness and inequity, the importance of settlement agreements in the amicable
resolution of the disharmonies that surround the demise of a marriage should be
preserved." Id. Moreover, the court suggested that such consensual arrangements
should be encouraged so long as the provisions reflect the parties' mutual wishes. See
q0

id.

9i2See

id. The court acknowledged that "a contractual provision terminating
alimony in the event of cohabitation potentially conflicts with the privacy interests of
the dependent spouse." Id. Specifically, the court admitted that cohabitation
agreements might encourage a financially dominant spouse to interfere in the life of
his former spouse. See id. Moreover, the court recognized that "[t] he policy that
ends alimony on the formation of a new legal bond is in derogation of the
dependent spouse's individual privacy, autonomy and the right to develop personal
relationships free from interference from either a supporting spouse or the state."
Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court conceded that a cohabitation
provision provides an incentive for the supporting party to investigate the former
spouse's private life, but minimized the impact of such an incentive by observing that
such a provision is comparable to "the incentive that any potential changed
circumstance may provide a paying spouse for ascertaining the current economic
status of the dependent spouse." Id. at 201, 729 A.2d at 15.
93 See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 201, 729 A.2d at
15. The court opined that "[p] rivacy
concerns may be addressed and mitigated by judicial supervision over agreements."
Id. Deferring to traditional concepts of contract and refuting concerns over privacy
rights, the court further declared that "[w]hile such an agreement may influence the
conduct of the parties, they will have knowingly entered into such agreements,
understanding what the provisions entail and, presumably, anticipating the extent to
which their freedom of action may be affected." Id. The majority asserted that
[a] cohabitation provision cannot become an instrument for vindictive,
vengeful, or oppressive actions on the part of the supporting spouse
nor can it be allowed to serve as punishment for post-divorce unchastity
on the part of a dependent spouse; it must be predicated on the
mutual wishes of the parties and reflect the economic realities that
usually flow from an intimate committed relationship.
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the court stressed that the judiciary would continue to monitor the
fairness of such divorce agreements.94
The majority then described the type of relationship that is
sufficient to enforce a cohabitation provision. 95 The court observed
that a qualifying relationship must be marked by stability and mutual
dependence and must also be serious and lasting. 96 The court listed
key, nonexhaustive potential indicators of a marriage-like
relationship, including living together, shared finances and joint
bank accounts, acknowledgment of the relationship by the couple's
family, and shared household duties and living expenses.9 7 Finally,
given the fact that cohabitation was found by the lower courts and
that the agreement between the Konzelmans was considered fair,
voluntary, knowing, and consensual, the court affirmed the judgment
below, thereby terminating Mr. Konzelman's alimony obligation.98
Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Hern charged that many of the
issues raised by the instant case had been settled by previous
decisions and that the majority's opinion was regressive.9 The dissent
countered the majority's position by reminding the court that the law
should not be concerned with the private lives of divorcees.' °° In
addition, Justice O'Hern stressed that the economic needs of
divorced women are the concern of the court and that the judiciary
had traveled a long and bumpy road in recognizing those needs.' °
See id. The majority reiterated that "in enforcing cohabitation provisions, the
court does not abrogate its equitable jurisdiction over divorce arrangements and its
responsibility to assure fairness in the implementation of such arrangements." Id.
See id. at 202-03, 729 A.2d at 16. The court noted that "[a] mere romantic,
casual or social relationship is not sufficient to justify the enforcement of a
settlement agreement provision terminating alimony." Id. at 202, 729 A.2d at 16.
See id. The court rejected the dissent's assertion that cohabitation was defined
or measured only by "sex" or gender. See id
97 See id. at 202, 729 A.2d at 16. Addressing the issue of
cohabitation, the court
observed that
[t]he ordinary understanding of cohabitation is based on those factors
that make the relationship close and enduring and requires more than
a common residence, although that is an important factor.
Cohabitation involves an intimate relationship in which the couple has
undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with
marriage.
Id.
See id. at 202-03, 729 A.2d at 16-17.
See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 204, 729 A.2d at 17 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The
dissent claimed that the court's opinion "turns back the clock on years of efforts to
improve the economic and social status of divorced women." Id.
See id, The dissent declared that "[t]he private lives of divorced women are no
business of the law. We have enough to do without inquiring into such matters." Id.
101 See id.
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Thus, urged the dissent, the financial needs of both spouses should
be considered when the court supervises a divorce settlement.'0 2 The
dissent also emphasized that a court can properly execute its
supervisory role only by remaining sensitive to the rights of women,
who often take the subordinate economic role in marriage.'"
Moreover, Justice O'Hern suggested that Konzelman, at its core,
was about sex and not merely about the freedom of contract and the
voluntariness of divorce agreements as posited by the majority.'"' In
furtherance of this point, the dissent challenged the majority's
position by questioning why cohabitation with someone of the same
sex is allowed without a reduction in alimony.' 5 Cautioning that
certain issues, namely personal freedom and privacy, should not be
the
allowed to be bargained away, °6 Justice O'Hern concluded that
0 7
followed.
been
have
should
test
needs"
"economic
long-standing
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Konzelman appears to mirror a larger debate that takes place
whenever historical gender or race inequalities come into play in
policy development. Participants ask how much, if at all, should
gender be taken into account.0 8 On one side are those who argue
See id. The dissent argued that "[w]hen the marriage partnership is over, we
do the best that we can to recognize the economic needs of the partners." Id.
103 See id. Justice O'Hern asserted that women frequently assume a subordinate
102

economic position in the marriage by filling child-rearing or non-income-generating
roles. See id. Accordingly, the dissent suggested that "[w]omen are at a particular
economic disadvantage in divorce because they typically do not control family assets
at the end of a marriage." Id at 205, 729 A.2d at 17 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
104 See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 205, 729 A.2d at 18 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The
dissent observed that "[w]hen viewed through the Gaussian filter employed by the
Court, the anti-cohabitation clause appears as a pleasant piece of bargaining between
equals." Id. at 205, 729 A.2d at 17 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
105
Id. The dissent commented that "[i]f the clause were not about sex, why then
is cohabitation with another person of the same sex permitted without a reduction in
suport?" Id.
See id. at 206-07, 729 A.2d at 18 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). Quoting ChiefJustice
Wilentz, the dissent stated that "'[t] here are, in a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy.'" Id. at 206, 729 A.2d at 18 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (quoting In re
Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (1988)). The dissent continued by
asserting that "[i]n a civilized society, money cannot buy a woman's right to choose
her companions. A husband should not be able to demand an exchange of that
freedom as a bargaining tool." Id. at 206-07, 729 A.2d at 18 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
107
See id. at 207-08, 729 A.2d at 18-19 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The dissent
declared that "the test for support should be based upon economic circumstances
because that standard 'best balances the interests of personal freedom and economic
support .... " Id. at 207, 729 A.2d at 19 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting Gayet, 92
N.J. at 154, 456 A.2d at 104).
See SONDRA FARGANIS, SITUATING FEMINISM: FROM THOUGHT TO ACTION 14-49
(1994) (discussing the spectrum of viewpoints with regard to gender).
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that sex inequalities are so entrenched in American society that they
inevitably impact outcomes and must be taken into account in the
name ofjustice and in the true spirit of equality. '°q On the other side
are those who claim that policies taking gender inequities into
account are patronizing, violate the principle of strict equality, and
reinforce the very attitudes their proponents claim to oppose.110
While the matter may be one more of politics.' than science, the
former position is more convincing in the instant case. Here, the
facts go beyond mere prejudices or attitudinal components-the
matter is not merely about perceptions of women not being strong
enough or shrewd enough to make a contract. The core issue is that
only women bear children, and, therefore, families structure their
lives around that biological reality. As a result, married women often
sacrifice educational and job opportunities, or interrupt careers for
childbirth, and thus are often dependent on husbands, and later exhusbands, for support. 1 2 Thus, while women may be more financially
independent today than in the past, the possible coercive effect of a
cohabitation provision remains enormous.'13
'109

See SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 173 (1989)
(asserting that

in the marriage context, the principle of freedom to contract "takes insufficient
account of the history of gender in our culture . .. [and] of the present substantive
inequalities between the sexes").
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF
THE LAW 101-10 (1990) (criticizing the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for straying
from the standard of formal equality in dealing with race and gender).
I For an interesting discourse concerning the interplay between philosophy
and
democracy and the ways in which judges are influenced by political philosophy, see
Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, POLITICAL THEORY, AUGUST 1981, at 379.
112

See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALrrY 134-35

(1996). Koppelman opines that
[t]he most pressing sex equality issue the nation faces today is the
massive impoverishment of single (usually divorced) women with
children. The project of eliminating "stereotypes" from the law has not
only prevented the law from addressing this state of affairs but
threatens to make it worse if pushed to its logical conclusions. By
eschewing old notions of female dependency (thus eliminating
normative stereotypes) and presuming that men and women are
equally capable of supporting themselves after divorce (thus
eliminating empirical stereotypes), courts have ignored ways marriage
itself economically disables women, since wives rather than husbands
tend to forgo educational and career opportunities for the sake of
child-rearing.
Id.
SeeOIN, supra note 109, at 170-86. Okin writes:
Some who are critical of the present structure and practices of
marriage have suggested that men and women simply be made free to
make their own agreements about family life, contracting with each
other, much as business contracts are made. But this takes insufficient
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Even if a swing in the "equity/contract" pendulum were in
order, something less drastic than the sweeping change effectuated
by the decision in Konzelman would have been a more appropriate
In Gayet v. Gayet," 4 the dissent proposed judicial
first move.
recognition of a "rebuttable presumption that alimony is no longer
justifiable" where it has satisfactorily been shown that the dependent
spouse

is cohabiting with

someone.1 1 5

Under

this plan,

the

dependent spouse would bear the burden of showing that she has a
continuing need for support." 6 The dissent in Gayet reasoned that as
it was the dependent spouse who altered the circumstances, it would
not be unreasonable or "unduly onerous" to ask her to shoulder the
Similarly, when a
burden of proving continued financial need.'
cohabitation provision is contained in a settlement agreement, as in
Konzelman, a court should consider adopting a comparable approach,
recognizing such clauses to the extent that they create a presumption
that may be rebutted by the dependent spouse upon a showing that
there is an ongoing financial need. Even this compromise is
problematic, however, because its unavoidable starting position is
that courts will recognize cohabitation provisions. Thus, it poses a
significant threat to privacy rights by encouraging, and maybe even
requiring, intrusive surveillance of the dependent spouse in order to
prove cohabitation.
Moreover, under the compromise stance,
dependent spouses' freedom and autonomy remain items to be
bargained for, or away, during the settlement process. Upon final
analysis, the middle position proposed by the dissent in Gayet stands
as a more just and reasoned option than that adopted by the majority
account of the history of gender in our culture and our own
psychologies, of the present substantive inequalities between the sexes,
and, most important, of the well-being of the children who result from
the relationship. As has long been recognized in the realm of labor
relations, justice is by no means always enhanced by the maximization
of freedom of contract, if the individuals involved are in unequal
positions to start with. Some have even suggested that it is consistent
with justice to leave spouses to work out their own divorce settlement.
By this time, however, the two people ending a marriage are likely to
be far more unequal. Such a practice would be even more catastrophic
for most women and children than is the present system. Wives in any
but the rare cases in which they as individuals have remained their
husbands' socioeconomic equals could hardly be expected to reach a
just solution if left "free" to "bargain" the terms of financial support or
child custody. What would they have to bargain with?
Id. at 173 (emphasis in original).
14 92 N.J. 149, 456 A.2d 102 (1983).
15 See id. at 156, 456 A.2d at 105 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
" See id., 456 A.2d at 105-06.
117 See id., 456 A.2d at 106.
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in Konzelman, yet falls short of ensuring that the basic rights of both
spouses will be protected throughout the process.
The economic needs test stands as the best method of matching
financial need to alimony obligation while safeguarding the fairness
and equity concerns so paramount in family law. The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Konzelman should have taken the opportunity to
reinforce the Gayet rule that anti-cohabitation provisions in divorce
agreements are unenforceable.
Jennifer Mara

